Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 38
Issue 3 Volume 38, Number 3 (Fall 2000)

Article 4

7-1-2000

The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future?
Claire L'Heureux-Dube

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Part of the Judges Commons

Article

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Citation Information
L'Heureux-Dube, Claire. "The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future?." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 38.3
(2000) : 495-517.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol38/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future?
Abstract
Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dubé explores the history and the role of dissenting opinions in Canadian law.
She argues that dissents contribute to the development of the law through their prophetic potential.
Dissents are also fundamental elements of judicial discourse, serving to safeguard the integrity of the
decisionmaking process and judicial independence. The Canadian legal tradition, like its American
counterpart, provides numerous examples of why, in 1951, future Chief Justice Bora Laskin praised the
"precious right" to dissent. Unanimity is not indispensable for judicial legitimacy or legal stability. In fact,
the presence of judicious dissents can portray the true complexity of legal reasoning more accurately,
while offering new possibilities for the law's evolution to judges, lawyers, and the public.

Keywords
Dissenting opinions; Canada

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0
License.

This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol38/iss3/4

THE DISSENTING OPINION:
VOICE OF THE FUTURE?*
BY THE HONOURABLE CLAIRE L'HEUREUX-DUBt*

Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 explores the history
and the role of dissenting opinions in Canadian law.
She argues that dissents contribute to the development
of the law through their prophetic potential. Dissents
are also fundamental elements of judicial discourse,
serving to safeguard the integrity of the decisionmaking
proess and judicial independence. The Canadian legal
tradition, like its American counterpart, provides
numerous examples of why, in 1951, future Chief
Justioe Bora Laskin praised the "precious right" to
dissent. Unanimity is not indispensable for judicial
legitimacy or legal stability. In fact, the presence of
judicious dissents can portray the true complexity of
legal reasoning more accurately, while offering new
possibilities for the law's evolution to judges, lawyers,
and the public.

Madame le juge L'Heureux-Dub6 examine l'histoire et
le r6le des opinions dissidentes en droit canadien. Elle
maintient que les dissidences contribuent au
d6veloppement du droit en raison de leur potentiel
prophetique. Les jugements dissidents sont un 616ment
fondamental du discours juridique puisqu'ils servent i
preserver Ala fois l'integrit6 du processus de prise de
d6ecision et l'independence judiciaire. Les traditions
juridiques canadiennes et amdricaines fournissent de
nombreux exemples qui appuient l'idee du "droit
pr6cieux" d'etre dissident 6nonc6 en 1951 par le futur
juge en chef Bora Laskin. L'unanimit6 n'est pas
indispensable pour assurer la lgitimit6 judiciaire et la
stabilit6 juridique. En effet, la presence des dissidences
represente fidMement la complexit6 r6elle du
raisonnement juridique, tout en offrant aux juges,
avocats et aux citoyens de nouvelles possibilit6s
6volutives du droit.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the
intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into
which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed. /

A thousand years ago, the choirs of Europe sang Gregorian
chant in unison; their melodies were beautiful, clear and orderly. But
these melodies could not satisfy the human spirit, which conceived of a
multitude of polyphonic harmonies and other musical forms. Courts,
too, may speak in unison or in a plurality of voices: the tradition of
dissent in the courts of common law countries has long allowed for a
certain measure of polyphony in the voices of the law.
In my view, dissenting opinions2 in Canada have encouraged a
blossoming of legal concepts and solutions, without going so far as to
cast a pall of dysfunctional dissonance over the courts. The tradition of
dissent is deeply rooted in Canada. Here, judges exercise their "precious
right" to dissent when they believe it to be necessary, 3 even while
observing certain constraints to which they voluntarily submit in order to
guarantee a minimum of institutional harmony. They have a tendency to

1 C. Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States (New York: Columbia University Press,
1928) at 68. Chief Justice Hughes was of the United States Supreme Court.
2 It is essential that we define "dissenting opinion" at the outset, to provide a framework for
the discussion to follow. A dissent may relate either to the result arrived at by the majority in
applying the law, or to the principles of law on which that result is based. The latter form of dissent
is of particular interest to us here, since it is more likely to have a significant impact on the law in
the future than would a dissenting opinion disputing only the result. It should also be noted that in
Canada, as in England and the United States, there may be several individual opinions that are in
mutual agreement or disagreement with one another. This may lead to a "plurality" decision (the
opinion supported by the greatest number of judges), accompanied by other opinions which may
agree in the result, but not as to the method by which the result is reached. In such cases, there are
no majority reasons per se. These types of decisions-now relatively rare in Canada-are a
legitimate target for criticism, as they tend to detract from the clarity and authority of the decision.
See C. L'Heureux-Dub6, "The Length and Plurality of Supreme Court of Canada Decisions" (1990)
28 Alta. L Rev. 581.
3 The former Chief Justice of Canada, Bora Laskin, spoke of the "precious right" of dissent.
See B. Laskin, "The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for Canadians" (1951) 29
Can. Bar Rev. 1038 at 1048. In Canada, however, little has been written about the tradition of the
dissenting opinion, although dissenting opinions are often the subject of comment in law reviews.
See infra, note 46.
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share with their English 4 and American 5 colleagues a positive,
sometimes even idealistic, vision of dissenting opinions, citing with
admiration certain "great dissents" relating to social justice and human
rights.
Justice Brennan of the United States Supreme Court eloquently
conveyed the essence of this vision in his observation that the ideal
6
dissenting opinion is both prophetic and persuasive. He suggested that

the dissenting opinion also safeguards the integrity of judicial
institutions by requiring the majority to justify the rationale for, and the
implications of, its decision.
Most dissenting opinions, however, do not fully live up to this
description. This may be because they advance essentially the same
analysis (if not the same result) as the majority, or because the vision of
7
the law they propound holds no attraction for future generations.

4 See the comments of a number of English Law Lords during the 1960s in A. Paterson, The
Law Lords (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982) at 104-09.
5 Much has been written in the United States regarding the contribution of dissenting opinions
to American law. See, for example, P. Jackson, Dissentin the Supreme Court (New York: William S.
Hein & Co., 1991); D.E. Lively, Foreshadows of the Law (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992); A.S.
Krishnakumar, "On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent" (2000) 52 Rutgers L. Rev. 781; R.
Primus, "Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent" (1998) 48 Duke L.J. 243; K. Stack, "The
Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court" (1995) 105 Yale L.J. 2235; T. Shea, "The Great
Dissenters: Parallel Currents in Holmes and Scalia" (1997) 67 Miss. L.J. 397; F.P. O'Connor, "The
Art of Collegiality: Creating Consensus and Coping with Dissent" (1998) 83 Mass. L. Rev. 93; M.
Mello, "Adhering to our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death
as a Punishment" (1995) 22 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 591; E. Gaffney Jr., "The Importance of Dissent and
the Imperative of Judicial Civility" (1994) 28 Val. U.L. Rev. 583; and M. Bergman, "Dissent in the
Judicial Process: Discord in Service of Harmony" (1991) 68 Den. U.L. Rev. 79.
6 W.J. Brennan Jr., "In Defense of Dissents," Mather 0. Tobriner Memorial Lecture,
reproduced in H. Clark, Justice Brennan: The Great Conciliator(Secaucus, N.J.: Birch Lane Press,
1995) at 256. His exact words were as follows:
The dissent is "offered as a corrective-in the hope that the Court will mend the error of
its ways in a later case.... The most enduring dissents are the ones in which the authors
speak, ... as 'Prophets with Honor.' These are the dissents that often reveal the perceived
congruence between the Constitution and the 'evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society,' and that seek to sow seeds for future harvest. These
are the dissents that soar with passion and ring with rhetoric. These are the dissents that,
at their best, straddle the worlds of literature and law. ... [T]he dissent ... safeguards the
integrity of the judicial decision-making process by keeping the majority accountable for
the rationale and consequences of its decision."
7 Jackson, supra note 5 at 3, put it clearly:
Generally the dissenter has viewed the core of mass acceptance with skepticism and
found it wanting. He has supplied the "con" in the debate that lies at the basis of modem
democracy. He has borne the scorn of the herd whose collective thinking he challenges.
He is the heretic whose heresy may not stand the rays of established thought or the
spectrum of time. Or he may be the prophet whose heresy of today becomes the dogma
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Indeed, even the most ardent defender of dissenting opinions will be
compelled to admit that in most cases, it is the majority opinion which
blazes the law's trail.
Despite this reality, Canadian, American, English and other
judges remain profoundly attached to their right to dissent. Moreover,
neither elected legislators nor the legal profession has shown any serious
desire to deprive judges of this right, although they have occasionally
expressed the need for judges to exercise their right to dissent with
greater restraint. Thus, while the idea of permitting the members of
France's constitutional court (the Conseil constitutionnel) to dissent may
seem revolutionary and even preposterous to some in that country, it
would be equally shocking, in our countries, if it were seriously suggested
that dissents should be banned.
In an effort to explain this enduring attachment to the tradition
of dissent, I will seek to substantiate the theory that dissenting opinions
make an important contribution to the development of the law, as they
are rich sources of all that is potential and possible in law. In order to do
so, I will begin by providing an institutional context by examining the
tradition and culture of judicial dissent in Canada. 8 Next, the
institutional context will be broadened so as to undertake a more
comprehensive examination of the role of dissenting opinions and their
benefits for judges and for legal institutions. This analysis will focus on
the three themes suggested by Justice Brennan's characterization of
dissents: prophesy, dialogue, and the role of dissenting opinions in
safeguarding the integrity of the judicial decisionmaking process and,
ultimately, of the law.

of tomorrow.
8 This paper will deal primarily with the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada, although the jurisdiction of that court covers all areas of Canadian law. It must also be
noted that the judges of the provincial courts of appeal also write dissenting opinions. To give just
one example, the dissenting opinions that are written by an appellate court are an essential part of
the law of criminal procedure, since the accused has an automatic right to appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada the decision of an appellate court in which one of the judges dissented: Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 691(1)(a) and 691(2)(a).
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II. THE TRADITION OF THE DISSENTING OPINION
IN CANADIAN LEGAL CULTURE
The origins of the dissenting opinion in Canada go back to the
traditions of the English common law courts. As of the fourteenth
century, judges of these courts hearing cases on appeal rendered their
judgments by individual (seriatim) opinions. 9 Both the judges and their
society were evidently of the view that the majority decision ruled, and
therefore that a dissenting opinion would not in itself detract from the
authority of the judgment or the institution. This acceptance of
individual opinions and dissents was eventually transplanted to Canada.
A number of changes were made to the model, however, with,the aim of

mitigating certain weaknesses which became apparent in the new and
particular institutional context of the Supreme Court of Canada.
Since their first decision in 1877,10 Canadian Supreme Court
judges have rendered their decisions in multiple voices, including
dissenting ones. Neither the legal profession nor elected legislators were
very impressed with the Court's early decisions, criticizing them on
several occasions for being somewhat incoherent and repetitive., These
concerns culminated in the first-and last-Canadian House of
Commons debate, held at the end of the nineteenth century, over
whether the Court's procedures should be amended to solve these

perceived problems. Ultimately, a majority of the members of the House
decided that there was no need to take legislative action to prohibit

seriatim and dissenting opinions. 12

9 See, on this point, K. Zobell, "Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of
Judicial Disintegration" (1959) 44 Cornell LQ. 186 at 187-91. See also Paterson, supranote 4 at 96100. The seriatimformat, however, was not the only one in existence in England. While the judges of
the House of Lords have rendered their decisions individually and sometimes in dissent since the
nineteenth century, this was not always the case. See Zobell at 189. As well, the Privy Council, the
court of last resort for the former British colonies, almost always rendered its decisions
unanimously. Apparently the Privy Council deemed that in its role as "Her Majesty's adviser," it
should not provide contradictory advice to the head of state. See Laskin, supranote 3 at 1073.
10 Prince Edward Island (Commissioner of Public Lands) v. Sulivan, [1877] 1 S.C.R. 3. The
bench was composed of five judges. Each judge delivered an opinion; Taschereau J. dissented.
11 See L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 2 at 583-84.
12 Perhaps this is because, at that time, there was still a right of appeal to the Privy Council in
England, a division of the House of Lords hearing appeals from the former British colonies. See: J.
Snell & F. Vaughan, The Supreme Court of Canada:Historyof the Institution (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1985) at 35. It is worth comparing the early years of the Supreme Court of Canada
with those of the United States Supreme Court. In the early 1800s, one of the first U.S. Chief
Justices, John Marshall, sought to have all decisions rendered in the name "of the Court" (that is,
per curiam, or unanimously and anonymously) as often as possible. He believed that seriatim
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No reform having been imposed from the outside, the judges of
the Supreme Court of Canada, and specifically Chief Justices Anglin,
Cartwright and Laskin, undertook a gradual reform of the Court's
internal procedures. Aware of the weaknesses of the seriatim opinion
model as it functioned in Canada, Anglin C.J. decided during the 1920s
that it was desirable for the judges to coordinate their efforts in order to
eliminate the repetition and incongruities to which their individual
opinions gave rise. Accordingly, whenever possible, he encouraged
judges to draft a single majority opinion that provided a clear and
concise statement of the material facts and the principles of law upon
which the judges agreed. When unanimity was impossible, however, the
Supreme Court judges continued to write majority and dissenting
opinions.1 3

Between 1930 and 1950, individual opinions were gradually
abandoned. When the Supreme Court became Canada's final appellate
court in 1949,14 however, members of the legal community continued to
voice complaints about the frequency of multiple opinions issued by the
Court.1S In response, during the 1960s Cartwright C.J. introduced
judges' case conferences after every hearing. This innovation played a
key role in reducing the number of multiple opinions and in improving
relations among the judges. Subsequently, Laskin C.J. went one step
further toward reducing multiple opinions. He borrowed from the
Americans, who had developed the format of the unanimous and
opinions tended to foster dissent and inconsistency. At the same time, however, no less a figure than
Thomas Jefferson was trying to convince the other judges, and specifically Justice Johnson, that the
judges should fight to preserve the seriatim format. According to one author, President Jefferson
was trying to undermine the influence of the Chief Justice, of whose opinions he was not
particularly fond. See Jackson, supra note 5 at 20-25. Since that time, however, the American
Supreme Court has never had a practice of systematically delivering unanimous decisions "of the
court" in all cases and, in fact, has tended generally in the opposite direction.
13 See L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 2 at 584.
14 See Snell & Vaughan, supra note 12 at 142.
15 See, for example, the words of Prof. Bora Laskin, supra note 3 at 1047, who in 1973 became
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, but who said in 1951:
Some of the cases reported in 1950 would indicate that from time to time there is a
serious effort to arrive at an opinion of the Court in the sense of having one judge speak
for all. But there are enough other cases reported in the same year which indicate-if I
may so say, with respect-a conspicuous waste of time and an unnecessary cluttering of
the reports with separate reasons by individual judges amounting to mere repetition. A
perusal of three recent cases-the rent control reference (Reference re Wartime Leasehold
Regulation, [1950] S.C.R. 124), the inter-delegation case (Nova Scotia (A.G.) v. Canada
(A.G.), [1951] S.C.R. 31) and the margarine reference (Reference re Validity of Section
5(a) of the DairyIndustry Act, [1949] S.C.R. 1, affd [1950] 4 D.L.R. 689 (P.C.))-reveals
that, aside from the dissenting judgments in the last case, the judges of the majority could
easily have said once what is set out several times to the same effect.
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cases, in which
anonymous decision "of the Court" for certain important
16

unanimity was regarded as both desirable and possible.

17
The enactment of the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms

in 1982 was a pivotal moment in the history of the Court. With the

Charter,Parliament introduced a form of constitutional judicial review
based on fundamental rights and freedoms. This change raised the

visibility and importance of courts in Canadian society virtually
overnight.18 Perhaps in response to this new challenge, dissenting
opinions became proportionately less frequent, on average, for the
Court overall. 19 Paradoxically, however, they also became more common
in cases involving constitutional guarantees of fundamental human rights

and freedoms. 20
Thus, the judges of the Supreme Court appear to have
recognized over time, even if unconsciously, that they must exercise a
degree of self-discipline in order to avoid having multiple, redundant
opinions detract from the quality of the Court's decisions and thereby
diminish its legitimacy. At no time has it been suggested, however, that
dissenting opinions should be suppressed. Moreover, Supreme Court
judges have fairly clearly retained what Chief Justice Dickson once
called their "fiercely independent" spirits, 21 particularly in the realm of
constitutional law.

16 See P. McCormick, "The Supervisory Role of the Supreme Court of Canada" (1992) 3
Supreme Court L.R. (2nd series) 1 at 27. This format is still the exception rather than the rule. It
was used in 1.6 per cent of the decisions rendered by the Court while Laskin was Chief Justice, and
in 9.8 per cent of decisions under Dickson CJ.
17

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
18 See, for example, P. McCormick, "Follow the Leader: Judicial Power and Judicial
Leadership on the Laskin Court, 1973-1984" (1998) 24 Queen's L.J. 237 at 239; and B. Wilson,
"Decision-Making in the Supreme Court" (1986) 36 U.T.L.J. 227 at 239.
19 Thus, although the Court has never sought to impose unanimity in all cases, the frequency
of dissenting opinions has fallen considerably, from 41 per cent in 1949 to 20 per cent in 1990. More
generally, the Court now renders fewer and fewer multiple concurring opinions. See McCormick,
supra note 16 at 24-25.
20 The Supreme Court does not publish statistics regarding the frequency of dissenting
opinions in the various areas within the Court's jurisdiction. However, a preliminary search based
on the electronic Quicklaw database of the Court's decisions, allows for an approximate calculation
of the frequency of dissenting opinions in appeals raising constitutional issues. The average
frequency of dissenting opinions in all constitutional law cases for the years 1877 to 1984 was 50 per
cent. The average frequency from 1985 to January 2000 for the same category of cases was 57 per
cent. Between 1982 and January 2000, in contrast, the average frequency of dissenting opinions in
constitutional appeals involving fundamental human rights under the Charterwas78 per cent.
21 Ontario Lawyers Weekly (27 July 1984) 14 at 14.
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Institutional tradition is not the only element which fosters such
independence of spirit. It also draws much of its inspiration from the
legal culture of the common law. From the first days of their legal
education, common-law lawyers are instilled with a narrative and an
adversarial culture in which the justification of one's reasoning is given
pride of place. For this reason, common-law lawyers tend to view the
drafting of opinions which seek to justify the choice of one of several
competing solutions as indispensable to the legal system. In addition,
they view judicial opinions as a source of guidance for resolving similar
issues in the future.22 Theirs is a vision of the law and of the role of
judicial decisions that readily admits of the possibility of a number of
divergent opinions on any given issue.
Notwithstanding the fact that the tradition of dissents is clearly
interwoven into the fabric of Anglo-Saxon legal tradition and culture,
however, the example of Quebec tends to show that neither tradition nor
culture is entirely determinative when it comes to dissenting opinions.
Although the legal system in Quebec is a hybrid of French and English
tradition and culture, the French influence remains very strong both in
private law and in the civil law approach to the hierarchy of sources of
law. Yet appellate courts in Quebec have, since the mid-nineteenth
century, adopted the practice of dissenting opinions, apparently without
detracting from the authority of their decisions or the coherence of the
civil law. 23
22 See M. Wells, "French and American Judicial Opinions" (1994) 19 Yale J. Int'l L. 81 at 86.
Although a majority of the opinions written may not conform exactly to this description, it provides
a good sense of the expectations of lawyers trained in the common law tradition. According to
Wells, there are various other possible explanations for the differences in style between French and
Anglo-American opinions, including the "formal" deductive reasoning of the civil law model, as
opposed to the more "substantive" American model (reasons based on social values and "judicial
policy"); the role of the courts in society (that is, the much broader scope of constitutional review
historically granted to American (and eventually Canadian) courts); and the legal history of
revolutionary France and the public's distrust of judges, as compared to the somewhat higher
esteem in which judges are held in the common law countries in which judges were more inclined to
subject governments to the rule of law.
23 The format of Quebec Court of Appeal decisions differs somewhat from the more typically
"common law" format of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, in that they begin with a
fairly formal statement of the result in the name of "The Court." The body of Quebec Court of
Appeal decisions often retains the more typically Anglo-American narrative and didactic style,
however, as well as allowing for the possibility of dissenting opinions. See E. Deleury & C. Tourigny,
"L'organisation judiciaire, le statut des juges et le mod~le des jugements dans ]a province de
Quebec" in H.P. Glenn, ed., Droit quib&ois et droitfrangais: communaut, autonomie, concordance
(Quebec City: Editions Yvon Blais, 1993) 191 at 215. Given that publication of decisions in Quebec
remained sporadic until the mid-nineteenth century, it is difficult to ascertain when the first
dissenting opinion was rendered in Quebec. See R. Crete, S. Normand & T. Copeland, "Law
Reporting in Nineteenth-Century Quebec" (1995) 16 J. Legal Hist. 147. It is therefore very difficult

20001

The Dissenting Opinion

Thus, the acceptance of dissenting opinions within the judicial
decisionmaking framework may depend more on the adoption of the
following three hypotheses than on legal tradition and culture per se. The
first hypothesis is that dissenting opinions do not jeopardize the
coherence of the law, provided that the law is understood to allow for
the existence of several possible solutions to a single question, at least in
the absence of clear and precise statutory provisions. The second is that
the institutional legitimacy of the courts is compatible with the individual
independence and impartiality of judges. The third hypothesis,
essentially a necessary corollary of the two initial ones, is that a majority
opinion will be viewed as sufficient to lend authority to judicial decisions.
In other words, unanimity is not the condition sine qua non of judicial
legitimacy or legal stability.
To some extent, accepting these hypotheses and permitting
dissents assists in making the rule of law more transparent, since they
allow courts to convey, in majority and dissenting reasons, the many
ideas and principles that often compete within a single normative
system. In addition, accepting dissenting opinions injects a certain
measure of democracy and freedom of expression into the judicial
decisionmaking process, since every judge has an opportunity to
participate fully, even while the majority decision rules the outcome.
Some jurists may be concerned by the potential for
incompatibility between democracy-an inherently political conceptand the rule of law. As Dickson C.J. has observed, however, any
functional democracy requires both freedoms and internal limits, in
order to balance social forces of order and dissent, of the individual and
collective will, and of certainty and flexibility:
IT]he values and principles essential to a free and democratic society ... I believe
embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of the human person,
commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs,
respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which
enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society. ... The rights and
freedoms ... are not, however, absolute. It may become necessary to limit rights and

to establish the source of dissenting opinions in Quebec. During the 1850s, however, the Lower
Canada law reports regularly show dissenting opinions. See Desbarats v. La Fabriquedu Quibec
(1851) 1 L.C. Rep. 79 (Q.B.), Rolland J. dissenting; British Fire and Life Assurance Company v.
McCuaig (1851) I L.C. Rep. 157 (Q.B.), Rolland J. dissenting;Lina v. Boyer (1851) 1 L.C. Rep. 139
(Sup. Ct.), Vanfelson J. dissenting. At the same time, however, these reports contain at least one
decision made by a panel of judgesper curiam: Bnmeau v. Fosbrooke (1851) 1 L.C. Reports 92 (Sup.
Ct.). This suggests, then, that Quebec's hybrid and unique format reveals the influence of the
English, French and American traditions in Quebec. All three are still evident in the present format
of the Quebec Court of Appeal's decisions.
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freedoms in circumstances where their exercise would be inimical to the realization of
collective goals of fundamental importance. 24

On the one hand, as past Canadian experience suggests, it must
be acknowledged that dissenting opinions have the potential to
destabilize judicial institutions if judges completely ignore certain
necessary constraints, whether voluntary or otherwise, designed to
ensure the efficient and effective functioning of the courts. On the other
hand, dissenting opinions may be viewed both as innovative yet,
paradoxically, potentially stabilizing forces in the law, particularly when
these opinions are oriented toward the future and invite dialogue with
those who are unsatisfied with, or feel excluded by, the majority
decision.
III. DISSENT AND PROPHECY
Turning more generally to the role of dissenting opinions in a
legal system, I adapt one of John Locke's well-known observations to the
legal context: new opinions in law are often suspect and are opposed for
the sole reason that they are not already shared by a majority of the
profession. 25 Yet society is continually undergoing transformation,
whether it be due to the advent of new technologies, globalization or
growing multiculturalism, to give just a few contemporary examples.
These challenges demand new ideas and the evolution of legal thought.
The following discussion of a few well-known dissenting opinions in the
Canadian and American Supreme Courts illustrates some of the ways in
which dissenting opinions may provide judges with a valuable means of
expressing new and alternative ideas and approaches, without going so
far as to cause an immediate change to the status quo.
In Canada, prior to the Charter's enactment, Supreme Court
decisions dealt primarily with private law and the division of powers
between the federal and provincial governments. Although dissenting
opinions of the first decades of the Court's existence occasionally took
the law in a new direction, they did not generally capture the
imagination of the legal profession or the public. During the 1970s,
however, dissenting opinions began to garner greater attention, as they

24

R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 136, Dickson C.J. See also K. Stack, supra note 5, who

suggests that the justification for dissenting opinions lies more in the theory of deliberative
democracy than in the concept of the rule of law.

25 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894).
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dealt with issues such as women's economic status and the rights of the

accused in criminal law.
Chief Justice Laskin, one of Canada's eminent jurists, often
found himself in dissent in these cases, at least during his early years on
the Supreme Court. His dissenting opinion in Murdoch v. Murdoch,26 for
example, may be viewed as an effort to refashion an ancient concept of

English property law, the "constructive trust," 27 to effect a more just
result in family law. He found that the constructive trust allowed for the
recognition of the right of a spouse, who has contributed to family
property through unpaid labour, to a share in that same property upon
divorce. His opinion later became the plurality opinion in Rathwell v.

29
Rathwell.28 It was then adopted by the majority in Pettkus v. Becker.
Although it may not have been expressly stated at the time, it seems
clear in retrospect that Laskin C.J.'s dissenting opinion in Murdoch
appealed to a new and emerging social and political awareness of the

need to recognize women's rights to equality.
For his part, Dickson J. often found himself in dissent in criminal
law cases prior to the advent of the Charter,often in conjunction with
Laskin C.J. and Spence J. In R. v. Leary,30 for example, Dickson J.
expressed his profound disagreement with the majority on the question
of whether to uphold the common law rule that a general intent offence
could never be met with a defence of intoxication 3 Much of his
26 [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423.
27 This concept recognizes that a person may hold an equitable interest in property, even
where the person does not hold legal title to the property, in cases where denial of the equitable
interest would result in the "unjust enrichment" of the legal owner.
28 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 436. In fact, Laskin C.J., Dickson, and Spence JJ. were with the majority in
the result, but did not have the majority's support for the basis on which they arrived at that result,
that is, the application of the "constructive trust." According to the two other judges who agreed
with Laskin C.J., Dickson, and Spence JJ. in the result, it was not necessary to invoke this doctrine
since the narrower and more traditional concept of "resulting trust" was sufficient for resolving the
issues arising on the facts of that case.
29 [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834. This development is particularly worth noting because this decision
acknowledges that the logic of the constructive trust may apply to common-law spouses. The Court
also relied on the constructive trust analysis in Rawluk v. Rawluk, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 70, interpreting
the provisions of a new statute on the division of matrimonial property which essentially
inoorporated the reasoning of Justices Laskin and Dickson.
30 [1978] 1 S.C.R. 29 [hereinafter Leary].
31 Canadian criminal law distinguishes between general intent offences (including sexual
assault) and specific intent offences (generally very serious crimes, such as murder). In 1978, the
defence of intoxication was available to an accused only in respect of a specific intent offence.
Justice Dickson sought, in his dissent, to elucidate the difficulties stemming from this distinction,
including the fact that it deprived the accused of a potential defence to numerous crimes. He
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reasoning was later adopted by Madam Justice Wilson, writing for the
minority in R. v. Bernard.32 It was ultimately adopted by the majority in
R. v. Daviault,33 which found, as Dickson J. had anticipated, that the
strict rule laid down by the majority in Leary violated fundamental
human rights principles, now guaranteed by the Charter.
The "great dissents" of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in
the United States provide additional and persuasive evidence of the
potential contribution of dissenting opinions to the law's evolution. At
the end of the nineteenth century, for example, Justice Harlan dissented
in a number of cases dealing with the constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws in the context of racial discrimination. With great
prescience, he foreshadowed the destructive social consequences to
which the majority's flawed vision of equality would lead. 34 During the
1950s, the mAjority of the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately transformed
the spirit of Harlan J.'s dissenting voice into law when Chief Justice
Warren's Court held that racial segregation in public schools constituted
a violation of constitutional equality rights. 3 5
Perhaps more than any others, the "great dissenters" of the early
twentieth century, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and Louis Brandeis,
embodied the role of the prophetic dissenting judge, all the while staying
within the bounds of the judge's role in a democracy. They were on the
bench at'a pivotal moment in the development of the welfare state in the
United States. Despite the contrary views of a majority of the judges on
the Court, they vigorously defended their opinion that courts should not
thwart the government's political will, as expressed in legislation, each
time the state sought to limit individual property rights and contractual
freedoms in the name of social justice and the rights of the
disadvantaged. Justices Holmes and Brandeis remained acutely aware,
however, of the potential for abuse through the exercise of such political
considered the rule to be incompatible with the fundamental principle that "generally speaking,
guilt depends upon proof by the Crown that the accused intended to do the acts with which he is
charged": Leary, ibid. at 32, 43.
32 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833, Wilson and L'Heureux-Dub6 JJ. with the majority in the result,
although in the minority as to the ratio. In fact, Dickson C.J. dissented with Lamer J., expressing the
view that Wilson J.'s opinion did not go far enough in terms of adopting his dissenting opinion in
Leary, supra note 30.
33 [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63.
34 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), Harlan J.dissenting; and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), Harlan J. dissenting. Justice Harlan held unconstitutional a statute prohibiting
"citizens of the black race" from travelling in the same train cars as white passengers, while the
majority affirmed its constitutionality, under the "separate but equal" doctrine. See also Gaffney,
supra note 5 at 601-4.
35

Brown v. Board of Education,347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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powers. Thus, they were prepared, in turn, to invalidate legislation that

interfered excessively with the fundamental freedoms of expression and
religion.3 6 Percival Jackson summarizes the contribution made by these

judges as follows:
The years of this [the Holmes and Brandeis] Court ... might well be termed the era of
qualitative dissent, as those of later years became the eras of quantitative dissent.
ITIheir dissenting opinions cast beams that lighted the subsequent ways of the law.
So Justices Holmes and Hughes furnished the prologue in the Frank case3 7 for Holmes's
majority opinion in the Moore case. 38 And it was Holmes and Brandeis whose dissents in
the child labor case 39 found later affirmation by Congress and the Court; ... whose clear
and present danger rule became the Court's guidance in the nineteen forties40 ... Truly
[this] court attested the need and value of dissent. 41

Notwithstanding the ultimate success of their ideas, it is valid to

ask whether the law today would be substantially different if Justices
Laskin and Dickson, or Justices Harlan, Brandeis, and Holmes, had
been prevented from communicating their dissenting opinions from the
bench. While the answer to this question is necessarily a speculative one,
many suggest that their dissenting opinions did play a key role in the

36 See, for example, United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929), in which Holmes and
Brandeis JJ. dissenting, asserted that the decision to deny citizenship to a foreigner should not
depend on the applicant's political opinions, including, in this instance, the pacifist beliefs of a
Jewish Hungarian woman.
37
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) [hereinafter Frank]. The dissenting judges argued
that the procedural rights of the accused, the owner of a business who was charged with killing one
of his employees, had been violated at his trial, since it had attracted national attention and had
been conducted in an atmosphere of prejudice and under threat from violent mobs.
38 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). Holmes J., this time for the majority, cited his
dissenting opinion in Frank, ibid., in support of his conclusion that a trial of African Americans
charged with murder had violated their constitutional rights to a fair and equitable trial, because the
court had been influenced by an "irresistible wave of public passion."
39
Hammer v. Dagenhart,247 U.S. 251 (1918). Holmes and Brandeis JJ. and two other judges
dissented in this appeal, in which the majority held unconstitutional Congress's prohibition on the
shipment of any product from a cotton mill in which children under fourteen were employed. This
decision was overruled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), in which the Court upheld the
FairLabor StandardsAct prohibiting, inter alia, the shipment and delivery of products manufactured
using the labour of children under the age of sixteen.
40 These were the words of Holmes J., dissenting with Brandeis J. in Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919), on the question of the limits of freedom of expression. At the time they were
writing, they sought to limit the power of the government to prohibit the expression of political
opinion supporting the Socialist Party, among others.
41 Jackson, supra note 5 at 168-69 [footnotes added by the author].
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gradual liberalization of constitutional interpretation in both countries. 42
It seems fairly safe to suggest, however, that the fact that certain
Supreme Court judges voiced their opposition to discrimination, for
example, should not be credited as having led directly to the victories
won by the civil rights movement in the United States.
Yet, we should not discount the impact of there having been at
least a few voices on the American Supreme Court promoting a more
equitable vision of society and of fundamental constitutional guarantees.
These voices may have given some hope to advocates and to concerned
members of the public that this alternative vision might one day become
a reality. In addition, the existence of such dissenting opinions within the
courts' own jurisprudence may have somewhat facilitated the task of
reiterating alternative views on equality and discrimination before the
courts, since their seeds were already planted in the law's fertile soil.
In addition to this important prophetic role, these "great
dissents" also gave the jurists of the time an opportunity to debate and
to analyse the relative merits of the majority and minority approaches to
important legal questions of the day. More generally, dissenting opinions
will often be very useful in appeals raising novel constitutional law
issues, as these opinions may identify a number of points requiring
further examination, although it may still be too early for the parties and
the courts to anticipate all of the possible ramifications of the majority
approach. 43 In such cases, dissenting opinions are not only prophetic, but
they are also an invitation for dialogue about the law's development in
these areas.
A number of dissenting judges have in fact pointed to this very
important aspect of dissents, by emphasizing that dissenting opinions are
often intended more for the legal minds of tomorrow than for those of
42 For the Canadian judges, see McCormick, supra note 16 at 24; for the American judges, see
Gaffney, supra note 5 at 608.
43 In Canada, for example, the constitutional right to freedom of expression has prompted a
number of dissenting opinions. While the first attempt to define the scope of the new guarantee
provided in section 2(b) of the Charter was rendered unanimously (see Ford v. Qu6bec (A.G.),
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 712), the judges of the Supreme Court were much less likely, in subsequent
decisions, to agree on the powers of the government to impose limits on that right under section 1
of the Charter,which allows freedoms to be restricted "subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." See, for
example, Irwin Toy v. Quibec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, Beetz and McIntyre JJ. dissenting; R. v.
Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, La Forest, Sopinka and McLachlin JJ. dissenting; R. v. Zundel, [1992]
2 S.C.R. 731, Gonthier, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. dissenting; R.J.R.-MacDonald v. Canada (A.G.),
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [hereinafterRR-MacDonald],La Forest, L'Heureux-Dub6, Gonthier and Cory
JJ. dissenting; Thomson Newspapers v. Canada (A.G.), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877, Lamer C.J., L'HeureuxDub6 and Gonthier JJ. dissenting.
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today. 44 It is important for courts and judges to be able to speak to

future generations, and to suggest that it is possible for the law to evolve
internally, at least "interstitially," as well as through legislative reform. 45
Without this capacity for internal renewal, courts risk being perceived as
an obstacle to change rather than as a viable forum for obtaining legal
recourse against injustice.
IV. DISSENTING OPINIONS AND DIALOGUE
Dissenting opinions have the potential, therefore, to lay the
foundations for future decisions, to be gradually constructed by people
who are interested in developing new approaches to existing law. In so
doing, they help to generate a fruitful dialogue among the courts,
academics, legislative assemblies, and future generations of lawyers. In

Canada, this dialogue has played an important role in the development
of the law, as academics make a practice of commenting on decisions

and arguing the relative merits of opinions, including dissenting
opinions.46 Regardless of whether their comments are intended to clarify
44

See Hughes, supranote 1; and Clark, supra note 6.
45 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg used this expression in the form of a
quotation from Prof. Gerald Gunther to describe the limited but significant power of the courts to
guide the development of the law in its interstices, without going too far by engaging in judicial
legislation. See R. Bader Ginsburg, "Speaking in a Judicial Voice" (1992) 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185 at
1209.
46 Examples of comments and articles on the decisions of the Court, including those discussing
dissenting opinions, are far too numerous to list here. Recently, for example, there has been a good
deal of commentary regarding decisions of the Court on important social issues which have
attracted considerable attention in the media and the legal community, including, for example, the
constitutional rights of the accused and the complainant in sexual assault prosecutions; euthanasia;
the federal government's power to regulate advertising by tobacco companies; homosexuals'
equality rights; and the constitutional rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. On the
constitutional right of an accused to cross-examine a victim of sexual assault and to tender evidence
of the victim's prior sexual conduct, see, for example, P. Kobly, "Rape Shield Legislation:
Relevance, Prejudice and Judicial Discretion" (1992) 30 Alta. L. Rev. 988; S. Martin, "Some
Constitutional Considerations on Sexual Violence Against Women" (1994) 32 Alta. L. Rev. 535; E.
Shilton & A. Derrick, "Sex Equality and Sexual Assault: In the Aftermath of Seaboyer" (1991) 11
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 107; J. Mclnnes & C. Boyle, "Judging Sexual Assault Law Against a
Standard of Equality" (1995) 29 U.B.C. L. Rev. 341. On the right of the accused to have access to
the medical and therapeutic records of victims of sexual assault, see the following articles and case
comments, which tend to support the dissenting opinions in the numerous decisions of the Court on
this subject: K. Busby, "Discriminatory Uses of Personal Records in Sexual Violence Cases" (1997)
9 C.J.W.L 148; J. Smith & R. Haigh, "Valorizing the Subjunctive: The Unfortunate Judicial
Contribution of R. v. Carosella" (1998) 32 U.B.C. L. Rev. 127; L. Colton, "R. v. Stinchcombe:
Defining Disclosure" (1995) 40 McGill L.J. 525. On the power of the federal Parliament to regulate
advertising by tobacco manufacturers and the dissenting opinion in RIR-MacDonald, supra note 43:
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the majority opinion in light of the dissenting opinion, or to transform
the dissenting opinion into positive law, they are always helpful to the
courts and to the legal community, and are often cited in the decisions of
the Supreme Court.
Dissenting opinions may also contribute to an ongoing dialogue
between the courts and legislative assemblies. 47 Over the past two
decades in Canada, for example, there has been a virtually constant
dialogue between the federal Parliament and the Supreme Court
concerning the prosecution of sexual offences such as sexual assault.
More specifically, certain statutory provisions protecting complainants
against cross-examination on irrelevant matters such as past sexual
history were initially found unconstitutional by the majority of the Court.
This gave rise to a dialogue between Parliament and the courts, in which
Parliament ultimately relied on both the majority and minority
approaches in drafting subsequent legislation on this and other similar
issues.
During the early 1980s, Parliament amended the Criminal Code
to protect victims of sexual assault against the airing in
cross-examination of the intimate details of their prior sexual history.48
In R. v. Seaboyer,49 the majority of the Court held that the new
provisions were unconstitutional in part, because they violated the right
of the accused to make full answer and defence.

M. Parrish, "On Smokes and Oakes: A Comment on RIR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.)" (1997)
24:3 Man. L.J. 665. On the question of euthanasia and Rodriguezv. British Columbia (A.G.), [1993] 3
S.C.R. 519: I. Dundas, "Case Comment: Rodriguez and Assisted Suicide in Canada" (1994) 32(4)
Alta. L. Rev. 811. On the equality rights of homosexuals and the dissenting opinions in the Court's
early decisions on that question, see: R. Wintemute, "Sexual Orientation Discrimination as Sex
Discrimination: Same-Sex Couples and the Charter in Mossop, Egan and Layland" (1994) 39 McGill
LiJ. 429; B. Donais, "Three Strikes and Human Rights is Out: Case Comment on Canada (A.G.) v.
Mossop" (1993) 57 Sask. L. Rev. 363. On the constitutional rights of the Aboriginal peoples of
Canada and the dissenting opinions of certain judges of the Court on that question, see, for
example, D. Elliott, "Fifty Dollars of Fish: A Comment on R. v. Van Der Peet" (1997) 35 Alta. L.
Rev. 759.
47 See generally P. Hogg & A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ. 75.
48
Act to amend the Criminal Code in relation to sexual offences and other offences against the
person and to amend certain otherActs in relationthereto or in consequence thereof, S.C. 1980-81-8283, c. 125, s. 19.
49 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 [hereinafterSeaboyer], L'Heureux-Dub6 J. dissenting. For a discussion
of the divergent approaches within the Court to the constitutional rights of victims and accused
persons, as they arise in the context of sexual assault prosecutions, see S. Martin, "Some
Constitutional Considerations on Sexual Violence against Women" (1994) 32 Alta. L Rev. 535.
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Parliament legislated again, essentially enacting the guidelines
laid down by the majority in Seaboyer.5O Shortly thereafter, however, the
Court was called upon to examine a different aspect of the rules of
evidence in this type of case, namely, disclosure to the accused of
victims' medical and therapeutic records. In the absence of legislative
guidance on this issue, the majority in R. v. O'ConnorSl established a
relatively low threshold for disclosure of this type of evidence. The
dissenting opinion formulated a more stringent test, based not only on
criteria of relevance and the importance of the accused's constitutional
right to make full answer and defence, but also on the constitutional
rights of sexual assault complainants to equality and privacy.52
Parliament rejected the approach taken by a majority of the
Court, which allowed for the admission of facts that were often
completely devoid of relevance, and legislated again, essentially adopting
the higher threshold for disclosure proposed in the dissenting opinion in
O'Connor.When the constitutionality of these provisions was challenged
in 1999, the Court unanimously concluded that the minority's alternative
approach as enacted in the new legislation did not violate the accused's
constitutional rights, with one relatively minor reservation expressed by
the chief justice. 53
Dissenting opinions may also generate a dialogue that goes
beyond exchanges among the courts, academics and legislatures. They
may be used as a valuable educational tool in the law faculties, which
focus on studying and discussing judicial decisions in relation to legal
doctrine and principles. Students may be asked to evaluate the relative
merits of the majority and dissenting opinions, each in light of the other,
in order to develop their analytical skills and make them aware of the
fact that the law may sometimes allow for several possible solutions to a
single problem.
In addition, since dissenting opinions often provide a new
perspective or approach to familiar concepts, they are particularly well
suited to initiating a dialogue with future generations who may share
such emerging perspectives. It is perhaps not surprising, for example,
50 See S.C. 1992, c. 38. The constitutionality of this legislation was recently upheld in R. v.
Damach, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443.
51 [1995] 4 S.C.R. 410 [hereinafter O'Connor].

52 See ibid., L'Heureux-Dub6 J. dissenting, LaForest, Gonthier, and McLachlin JJ. concurring.
53 See R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668. This time, Lamer C.J. dissented in part, on the basis that
the new provisions were unconstitutional in part, since they infringed the rights of the accused by
their application to records in the possession or under the control of the Crown, as opposed to
records in the possession of third parties.
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that the four women who have sat on the Supreme Court of Canada
since 198254 have written or supported dissenting opinions more often
than average, 55 particularly in interpreting constitutional equality rights,
be they directly at issue or indirectly at issue in criminal 56 and tax law
cases.57
Last but not least, dissenting opinions may contribute to an
international legal dialogue, as courts seeking solutions to problems in
areas where they do not yet have a wealth of jurisprudence may look to,
and choose from, any one of the various approaches developed in
majority or minority decisions emanating from other jurisdictions. For
instance, a number of dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court of
Canada have been cited by the majority of the Constitutional Court of
South Africa, in the course of interpreting its new constitution, and
specifically the provisions regarding equality rights.58
V. THE DISSENTING OPINION: SAFEGUARDING THE
INTEGRITY OF THE LAW AND JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS
In addition to their potential contribution to the law's
development, dissenting opinions serve other important functions.
Specifically, they may enhance the jufdiciary's legitimacy by preserving
54 Justices Bertha Wilson (who sat from 1982 to 1991), Beverley McLachlin (appointed in
1989, now Chief Justice), I (appointed in 1987), and Louise Arbour (appointed in 1999) are the
four. It is too early to comment on this trend in relation to our new colleague, Justice Louise
Arbour, who was appointed in June 1999.
55 See F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell & T. Riddell, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms: A Descriptive Analysis of the First Decade 1982-1992" (1996) 5 N.J.C.L. 1 at 39; and P.
McCormick, "The Most Dangerous Justice: Measuring Judicial Power in the Lamer Court,
1991-97" (1999) 22(1) Dal. L.J. 93 at 123.
56 See, for example, and again in the context of prosecutions for sexual offences, R. v. Osolin,
[1993] 4 S.C.R. 595, La Forest, L'Heureux-Dub6, Gonthier and McLachlin JJ. dissenting;
O'Connor,supra note 51, La Forest, L'Heureux-Dub6, Gonthier and McLachlin JJ. dissenting; and
R. v. Esau, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 777, L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin JJ. dissenting.
57

See Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695, L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin JJ. dissenting;
and R. v. Thibaudeau,[1995] 2 S.C.R. 627, L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin JJ. dissenting. We do
not always speak, however, in a unanimous voice. See, for example, Seaboyersupra note 49; and
Gould v. Yukon Order ofPioneers, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 571.
58 See Hugo v. State President of the Republic of South Africa, [1997] S.A.J. No. 4, online:
QL(SAJ), in which the Court approved, in part, the rationale of one of the dissenting opinions in
Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. See also NationalCoalitionfor Gay and
Lesbian Equality and Othersv. Ministerof Home Affairs and Others, [1999] S.A.J. No. 82, online: QL
(SAJ). See generally C. L'Heureux-Dub6, "The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the
International Impact of the Rehnquist Court" (1998) 34 Tulsa L.J. 15
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and strengthening judicial independence, by fostering collegiality among
judges and by enhancing the coherence of courts' decisions.
Dissenting opinions strengthen individual judicial independence
by ensuring that at the end of the day, judges answer only to their
individual consciences. In contrast, prohibiting the expression of
dissenting opinions risks jeopardizing judicial independence, impartiality
and open-mindedness. 59 For if it is impossible to dissent, a judge who is
open to persuasion by the evidence and submissions may nevertheless be
prevented from acting in accordance with his or her own understanding
of the applicable law, where this understanding does not conform to that
of the majority. 60 Where there is serious disagreement, a judge's inability
to express his or her own opinion creates a situation entirely antithetical
to the Canadian conception of the role of the impartial and openminded judge.
Dissenting opinions also tend to preserve a judge's personal
integrity: the judge is not obliged to sign onto opinions with which he or
she disagrees. One need look no further than the examples of Justices
Thuirgood Marshall and William Brennan Jr. in the United States, who
repeatedly expressed their unwavering dissent from the majority's
acceptance of the constitutionality of the death penalty,61 to imagine the
internal conflicts and the frustration experienced by judges faced with a
total inability to express their profound disagreement.
At the institutional level, dissenting opinions tend to foster
collegial relations among judges, even while they allow them to be true
to themselves. First, judges who have a different and minority
perspective on certain questions are not obliged to confront their
colleagues at every turn, in the hope of having at least a few of their
views incorporated into the majority decision. Instead, they may choose
to communicate their opinion directly to the legal community and to the

59 In Canada, impartiality is defined as "a state of mind in which the adjudicator is
disinterested in the outcome and is open to persuasion by the evidence and submissions." SeeR. v.
RD.S., [199713 S.C.R. 484.
60
This is not to say, however, that dissenting opinions do or should put a definitive end to the
process of discussion, and therefore of mutual influence, that is inevitably a part of the act of
judging together with a number of colleagues. Justice Brandeis, for example, apparently used drafts
of dissenting opinions strategically on occasion, not so much because he was particularly eager to
dissent, but rather because he knew that by forcing the majority to compare its reasons to his own
dissenting opinion, he would very likely persuade the majority of the importance of changing their
reasons to reflect his analysis. See P. Strum, L.D. Brandeis, Justice for the People (New York:
Schocken Books, 1988) at 369-70.
61 See, for example, Clark v. Arizona, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980); and Gaffney, supra note 5 at 620-
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public, rather than seeing it nipped in the bud. Secondly, the majority is
not continually obliged to attempt to arrive at a compromise that may
accommodate as many views as possible at the expense of the clear and
coherent enunciation of principles. 62
Interestingly enough, in Canada the incoherence and lack of
clarity of certain majority decisions has generally tended to come under
greater fire than the writing of dissenting opinions. 63 This suggests that
both the public and the legal profession recognize that it would be
unrealistic to expect judges to be unanimous at all times, perhaps
because the constitutional questions submitted to the courts are almost
always highly controversial and often very difficult to resolve to
everyone's satisfaction. Instead, it seems accepted that the quality of its
reasoning, rather than unanimity per se, provides the best safeguard of
the judiciary's institutional legitimacy and the authority of courts'
decisions.
In fact, in my view, one creates a false dichotomy by equating
unanimous opinions with clarity and authority, while associating
dissenting opinions with incoherence. Where there is profound
disagreement among judges, the law itself is the greatest beneficiary of
dissenting opinions: instead of sacrificing lucidity to an overriding need
to accommodate diverging views, judges may focus their efforts on the
logical and persuasive justification of their own understanding of the
law, whether it be a minority or majority one.

62 Chief Justice Hughes of the United States Supreme Court wrote the following on this
subject, supra note 1 at 67:
When unanimity can be obtained without sacrifice of conviction, it strongly commends
the decision to public confidence. But unanimity which is merely formal, which is
recorded at the expense of strong, conflicting views, is not desirable in a court of last
resort, whatever may be the effect upon public opinion at the time. This is so because
what must ultimately sustain the court in public confidence is the character and
independence of the judges. They are not there simply to decide cases, but to decide
them as they think they should be decided.
63 In Canada, this was the problem created by seriatim opinions, which diminished the
authority of judgments because it was impossible to determine the actual ratio approved by the
majority, since each judge stated it differently. See Snell & Vaughan, supra note 12 at 35. However,
this problem did not totally disappear when seriatim opinions were abandoned. In R. v. Mills, [1986]
1 S.C.R. 863, for example, a road map was needed to identify both the principles and the outcome
approved by the majority (Beetz, McIntyre and Chouinard JJ. wrote together, while La Forest J.
wrote a separate opinion), or even those approved by the dissenting judges (Dickson C.J. and
Lamer J. writing together, with Wilson J. writing a separate dissenting opinion). For more recent
examples of this phenomenon, see R. v. Morgentaler,[1988] 1 S.C.R. 30; RIR-MacDonald,supra note
43; and O'Connor,supra note 51. This phenomenon is increasingly rare. The difficulty it creates for
lawyers and judges lies not in the fact that there are dissenting opinions, but rather in the fact that
there are several opinions, agreeing in the result but not in the reasoning by which it is reached.
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In addition, dissenting opinions may contribute to improving the
quality of judicial decisions by keeping the majority accountable. On the
one hand, the judge writing for the majority must persuade his or her
colleagues of the soundness of the majority opinion, or else risk losing
their support. 64 For their part, dissenting judges will often make a
conscientious effort to demonstrate the weak links in the majority's
reasoning. In some cases, this may lead the majority to make changes to
its reasoning. It may even lead to a change in who ultimately writes for
the majority, if the dissenting judge is able to persuade several
colleagues of the soundness of his or her criticism. Thus, dissenting
judges will strive to provide a rigorous analysis of the questions at issue
in order to persuade both their colleagues and the public that their
approach is to be preferred. Indeed, to understand the qualities which
guarantee the enduring resonance of an important dissenting opinion,
one need only look to the examples discussed above, with their
reasoning based on meticulous research and on an entirely justifiable
approach to the law.
Nevertheless, and as past Canadian experience has tended to
suggest, the indiscriminate exercise of the right to write a separate
opinion has the potential to jeopardize the integrity of the law and of
legal institutions. Institutional legitimacy necessitates certain limits on
the exercise of this right so as to avoid the negative excesses of total
individualism. On this point, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the United
States Supreme Court has correctly suggested that the few real dangers
posed by dissenting opinions include: the too frequent use of dissenting
opinions for trivial reasons; and the use of immoderate and overly
critical language with respect to the majority decision. 6S She goes on to
observe that the most effective dissents are those which can be read
independently of the majority opinion. These dissents state the points of
disagreement with the majority, without adopting an unnecessarily
vicious tone that could jeopardize professional relations between judges,

64 See Wilson, supra note 18 at 236. This article, written by a former judge of the Supreme
Court of Canada, provides a detailed and accurate description of how the Court operates at 235-38.
The principal steps in drafting reasons, as she accurately describes them, include (1) the conference
after the hearing, during which the judges exchange ideas and coordinate the drafting of the opinion
or opinions; (2) the drafting of opinions and circulation of drafts to the judges; (3) exchanges of
comments among the judges and, if necessary, recirculation of new drafts. At this stage, even if the
conherence resulted in a unanimous Court, there may be one or more judges who will decide that
they cannot concur with the majority opinion and that they must write a separate opinion; (4) the
judges concur with one or another of the opinions, having read all of the opinions circulated.
65 See Bader Ginsburg, supra note 45 at 1191.
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as well as the public's respect for, and confidence in, the courts. 6 6 Both
the Canadian and American "great dissenters" remain role models in all
of these respects, since they dissented only when they considered it to be
absolutely necessary and made sure to support their opinions with welldeveloped legal argument. 6 7
Returning to the present, it is interesting to note that over the
past ten years, approximately 70 per cent of the Supreme Court of
Canada's judgments have been unanimous. 68 This provides a clear
indication, that judges write separate or dissenting opinions only when
there are important points of disagreement. Thus, in most appeals, even
these "fiercely independent" judges apparently agree that the benefits of
a coherent unanimous decision outweigh their more minor individual
concerns. This trend is entirely consistent, moreover, with the higher
incidence of dissenting opinions in the area of constitutional law,6 9 since
this field inevitably involves questions that may be expected to generate
more profoundly divergent views.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this polyphonic world, it is important to acknowledge the
value of all potential sources of new melodies. The highest constitutional
court in the land is one such potential source. In my view, the Canadian
and American experiences show that dissenting opinions in decisions
having major significance for civil society, or raising novel questions of
law, allow the law to adapt to society's new values and realities. This
adaptation occurs gradually, through judges' explorations and
explanations of various possible approaches to a single problem, in
tandem with the efforts of present and future legal minds. Dissents tend
to strengthen the legitimacy of judicial institutions by reinforcing judicial

66 See ibid. at 1196. It seems that in the United States, the problem of extremely harsh
.criticism by one judge of another is beginning to be a cause for concern. Canada has not yet really
had this kind of problem to date. See also Gaffney, supra note 5.
67 See Bader Ginsburg, supra note 45 at 1191; Jackson, supra note 5 at 18-19. Even Holmes J.,
one of the "great dissenters," said that it is pointless and generally undesirable to dissent, except
when a judge is profoundly persuaded of his opinion. See Northern Securities v. United States, 197
U.S. 244 (1904); O.W. Holmes, His Book Notices and Uncollected Letters and Papers (New York:
Central Book, 1936) 196.
68 See Supreme Court of Canada, Statistics: 1990 to 2000, available online: Supreme Court of
Canada, <http:llwww.scc-csc.gc.calinformation/statistics/download/ecourt.pdf> (date accessed: 26
February 2001).
69
See supra note 20.
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impartiality and collegiality and by enhancing the coherence of judicial
decisions. In constitutional law, dissenting opinions may play a
particularly useful role with respect to human rights issues, for example,
as dissents tend to facilitate the development of a rich jurisprudence
capable of evolution over time.
Of course, dissenting opinions will not always contribute to the
law in a significant way. They often become obsolete the instant they are
published, since lower courts generally cite only the majority opinion, 70
given that dissenting opinions are generally of little precedential value.
Sometimes, however, dissenting opinions retain their full force and are
ultimately transformed into fundamental legal principles that might
never have seen the light of day if dissenting opinions had been
prohibited. Indeed, within this very uncertainty lies one of the most
persuasive justifications of all for allowing dissents: by permitting
dissenting opinions, we ensure that the seeds of innovation are not
crushed under the weight of majority opinion, even before they are able
to take root in the spirit of the law.

70 The lower courts in Canada cite the majority opinion of the Supreme Court 90 per cent of
the time. See P. McCormick, "The Most Dangerous Justice: Measuring Judicial Power" (1999) 22
Dal. L.J. 93 at 103.

